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Since the sem:i,nal contribution of Downs [1957), spatial 
models have been used to analyze the electoral process. However, 
their utility has been severely limited by (at least) four stringent 
' . 1 assumptions. First, typical spatial models, henceforth to be called
Euclidean models, require that the messages.candidates transmit to 
voters be the points of an Euclidean issue space. A point message 
indicates a candidate's promised issue outcome. Perfect candidate 
mobility and a perfect flow of information from candidates to voters 
are two aspects of this assumption. Secondly, in the basic spatial 
models all promises are believed -- the issue outcome that a voter 
believes will occur if a candidate is elected is assumed to be 
identical to the candidate's point message. Thirdly, every indivi-
dual's preferences are required to be complete qver the entire issue 
space and often to decline with distance from an ideal point. 
Finally, candidates are usually assumed to perceive the preferences 
of all voters over all points in the issue space. 
These requirements of Euclidean spatial models have been 
questioned by political scientists -- Page [1975) is part�cularly 
2 
critical. In this paper, a weakening of each of the above assumptions 
will be shown to lea� naturally to a model employing a non-Euclidean 
outcome space which can be viewed as the set of points on the surface 
of a hypersphere, Under the primary interpretations to be offered in 
section I, this space is composed of the directions in which a status 
quo point in an Euclidean issue space can shift. 
In section II the basic model is described as a two-person 
plurality game in which the candidates adopt shift directions as 
strategies. Equilibrium directions in this game, however, are shown 
to be in the core of a corresponding n-person absolute majority r�le 
game. Necessary and sufficient conditions are then easily establish00 
for the existence of an equilibrium direction. 
In section III, optimal strategies for a candidate competinf; 
against a rigid opponent are investigated. The result is a prediction 
of candidate divergence, somewhat analogous to that made by Hinich and 
Ordeshook (1968] within the context of an Euclidean model. 
Finally, directional voting is embedded into the framework 
of Euclidean models in section IV, and the existence of point equili­
bria is shovm to imply the existence of equilibrium directions. 
Equilibrium direction vectors will be shown to "point" towards equili-
brium points, provided the latter exist. 
I. MOTIVATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Four different conceptualizations of the set of messages 
. 
that candidates send to voters, the set of possible outcomes that 
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voters perceive, and the relationship between these two sets can 
serve as foundations to the basic direction model. First, both the 
messages candidates transmit and the outcomes voters associate with 
them can be considered as single points in an Euclidean issue space. 
However, individuals may often map all candidate messages into point 
outcomes only a marginal distance from the status quo -- the point in 
, the issue space that represents the current state of the world on the 
relevant issues. The possible causes of this virtual shrinkage of 
the issue space are twofold: (1) for physical or political reasons, 
candidate mobility in the message space may be restricted to a 
neighborhood of the status quo -- truthful and knowledgeable cand±-
dates will only choose messages within this· neighborhood; (2) based 
perhaps on past performances, voters may not believe any winning 
candidate can achieve a large shift of th� status quo, regardless of 
campaign promises (messages). When a candidate's actions can only 
marginally shift the status quo, only the directions in which he 
proposes to shift it are important. Strategies can be considered as 
directions which shall be represented as vectors of unit or zero length. 
A second behavioral motivation of the direction model can 
be based on imperfect communication. Candidates may still attempt 
to send messages that voters will view as point outcomes. But due 
to high information costs, voters may not become aware of the exact 
issue positions that candidates adopt. From Campbell et al. (1960] 
to Page (1975], empirically-oriented political scientists have been 
critical of models that assume a perfect flow of informat·ion from 
candidates to voters. However, if candidates are able to at least 
convey their .E!.2_ and con opinions and the relative stresses they
place upon the issues, they may be able to transmit the directions 
in which they would shift the status quo, 
Thirdly, suppose one of the following is true: (1) as 
Page (1975) suggests, individual preference ordering are complete 
or well�defined only in a neighborhood of the familiar status quo; 
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(2) individual indifference surfaces actually take the form of rays 
emanating from the status quo; or (3) candidates only receive reliab:.. ·J 
information about preferences near the status quo. Then candidates 
may have no incentive to adopt more than directions or, equivalently, 
'marginally shifted points as their strategies, since they can know 
only how voters respond to such strategies. 
The above rationalizations for direction strategies have 
been based upon the concept of an Euclidean issue space. However, 
if the outcome space into which voters transform candidate messages 
t 1 J.'n nature, it may not possess the Euclidean is cognitive or percep ua 
structure. In particular, Weisberg (1974] hypothesizes that some 
political issue spaces can be modeled as closed circles. As an 
exampte, Weisberg refers to the Swedish Riksdag, where parties of the 
so-called left and right sometimes vote together against the moderates. 
So the fourth conceptualization that can serve as a basis for the 
direction model, although it would now be inappropriately named, is 
that the set of perceived outcomes is a non-Euclidean space isomorphic 
2to the surface of a hypersphere. 
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Assumptions about individual preferences are also required. 
In the basic model we assume each voter most prefers the status quo 
to shift in a particular direction. A voter will rank directions 
negatively with the size of the angle they form with h�s most pre­
ferred direction. Formally, suppose that v1 and v2 are two
direction vectors, and s is the direction vector representing some 
voter's most preferred direction. Then the voter will prefer the 
direction.of v1 to that of v2 if and only if s'v1 > s'v2. Further-
more, as is usual, we assume a voter's preferences for candidates 
are identical to his preferences for the directions they adopt. 
All of these preference assumptions are analogous to those 
made in simple Euclidean spatial models --. simply substitute pre­
ferred points for preferred directions, and Euclidean distances for 
3 angles. But they can be better justified here. Suppose two candi-
dates choose vectors z1 and z2 that are the same distance d from the
status quo in the directions of v1 = z1/d and v2 = z2/d. Then the
directional preferences described above approximate preferences that 
can be.represented by a dif�erentiable utility function �- s' (v1 - v2)
is a linear approximation to [u (z1) - u (z2)J/d when s is the (normal­
ized) utility gradient at the status quo. The approximation becomes 
exact if candidates can adopt points only marginally distinct from 
4the status quo. 
II. THE BAS IC MODEL 
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In the basic direction model, two candidates compete by 
choosing vectors v1 and v2 of unit or, to allow null shifts, zero 
length in the set of directions B = BU {O}, where B = · { v £ En : 
II v II = l}. Each voter i most prefers a vector si £ B. An 
arbitrary probability measure P defined on (Borel) subsets of B 
represe�ts the distribution of voters' preferred direction vectors, 
imposing no limitation on the number of voters. The directional 
I 
preferences of voter i are represented by the inner product siv.
Thus the fraction of the electorate who votes for candidate j is 
P[s'(vj - vk
) >OJ. Geometrically, for the case of v
j � 0
{j =,l, 2), j's votes are obtained from the fraction of the 
electorate whose preferred direction vectors lie on the same side 
as vj of a hyperplane containing the origin and the mid-vector 
v1 +· v2• The indifferent voters are those whose ideal direction · 
ve�tors lie in this dividing hyperplane -- for lack of a more 
realistic assumption in this setting, they are assumed to abstain. 
Notice that voters with si = 0 are assumed to always be indifferent. 
Each candidate j is assumed to maximize his plurality: 
Because of the symmetry of the two _person game played by the candi­
dates, an equilibrium can be defined as a direction that guarantees 
a �onnegative plurality to any candidate who' adopts it. 
Definition 1: An equilibrium direction vector v* is a direction 
in B for which PL1(v*, v) � 0 for all v £ B. 
The first tauk is to show the relationship between 
equilibrium directions in the two-person plurality game and undomi-
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nated directions in the n-person absolute majority game. An undomi-
nated direction in the latter is one that is not ranked below another 
by a st�ict majority of the voters
5
: 
I Definition 2: A direction vector v* £ B is undominated provided 
P [s' (v* - v)] !: 1/2 for· all v e B. 
It would be disturbing to finJ equilibrium directions 
that were not undominated, for then a direction may exist which is 
preferred by,a majority to the direction adopted by the winning 
c�ndidate. Theorem 1 below shows that this cannot occur. Further-
more, theorem 1 shows that undominated directions are equilibria if 
P[s = O] = O, that is, i.f nobvdy is indifferent over all directions. 
This .result is not obvious because a positive fraction of the voters 
may still be indifferent between any two directions v1 and v2, 
allowing the possibility that P[s'(v1 - v2)} � 1/2 even though 
PL1 (v1, v2). <O. (The lengthy proof of theorem l is in an Appendix.) 
Theorem 1: Equilibrium directions are undominated. Conversely, if 
'P[s • O] • O, then.undominated directions are equilibrium directions. 
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One use of theorem 1 is to provide necessary conditions for 
equilibrium directions, since a condition both necessary and sufficient 
for undominated directions is easily obtained. 
Theorem 2, similar to a result provided in Matthews (1977) for a 
finite set of voters,,is proved below in general and then discussed. 
Theorem 2: v>� is an undominated direction vector if and only if 
P[s'a � OJ � 1/2 for all a 8 En satisfying a'v 
* ::: o. 
Proof: 
* i< 
Suppose v is undominated and that a'v > o. 
* * 
We tnay assume a "' 1, and hence, letting v "' v - (2a'v )a,
have that a'v 
* *
v 8 B. Then > 0 and P[s'a ?: 0 J "' P[(2a'v )s'a ?: OJ 
* i' * P[s' (v - v) ;:: O] � 1/2. If a'v 0 and v f 0, there exists a
sequen�e· {a1, a2, . . •  } that converges to a and whose members satisfy 
a�v
* 
> 0. Hence P[s'an?: OJ ?: 1/2 for all an, and
P[s1a?: OJ ?: lim P[s'an � OJ ?: 1/2 is established by an argumentn->«> 
like .that used to prove theorem 1. Finally, if v
* 0, then
P[s'a .2: OJ"' P[s'(v* -(-a)?: OJ � OJ<: 1/2 for any a 8 Band hence
for any a 8 En.
Conversely, suppose P[s'a?: OJ ?: 1/2 whenever a•v* ?: O.
' * * * * Siµce (v - v)'v <: 0 for any v 8 B, P[s'(v - v)J ?: 1/2 and v is 
dominant. 
The condition of theorem 2 actually consists of two different 
parts, namely, that P[s'a?: O] � 1/2 whenever (1) a•v
* 
"' O and
* 
whenever (2) a'v > 0. Satisfaction of the first part means simply
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that the individuals whose ideal direction vectors lie upon any hyper­
* 
plane containing v and the origin, or to one side of it, constitute
a (weak) majority of all individuals. This property is entirely 
analogous to the property that Hoyer and Mayer [1974, 1975J define a 
total median to satisfy for an Euclidean spatial model: every hyper­
plane containing a total median must bisect the distribution of 
voters' preferred points in the issue space. 6 
Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich [1972J, and later Sloss (1973] 
and Hoyer and Mayer [1974, 1975], show:that in the simple Euclidean 
model an undominated point exists if and only if it is a total 
median. But for the direction model, part (2) as well as part (1) 
of the condition in theorem 2 is needed to obtain existence. 
Distributions of the electorate exist that satisfy the bisecting 
property of part (1), but do not allow the existence of undominated 
directions. A continuous example appears' in figure 1, where the 
distribution of preferred directions is represented by the area 
between the unit circle B and the curve f(s). Each of the lines H
1
,
M2, and M3 has a greater fraction of the electorate's preferred
directions on one side of it than on the other. (The signs "+" 
and "-" near each line Mi indicate which side of it the greater
fraction of voters' preferred directions lie.) No undominated 
direction can exist, since any direction will lie on the "-" side 
of some line Mi and so will receive fewer votes than a direction
located symmetrically on the opposite side of Mi. However, some
Mi. L M3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
·I
FIGURE 1 
, A Distr ibution in Which No Direction Is an Equilibrium
Eve n  Though a Bisecting Direction Vector Exists 
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directions will satisfy part (1) of the condition, such as the 
vector v1 that lies in the bisecting line L. Since v1 lies on the
11-11 side of M1, it will receive only 1/4 the. votes in a contest
against v2.
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In a Euclidean model, a candidate who diverges from a fixed 
opponent will only lose votes. So if the opponent has chosen a total 
median, the diverging candidate can only decrease his plurality from 
zero. In the direction model, however, a diverging candidate will 
gain the votes of voters whose preferred directions directly oppose 
those of the voters he loses. Even if the opponent has �dopted a 
•median-like direction, a diverging candidate may win a strict majority
by diverging so as to gain more votes than he loses. The complete
condition of theorem 2 eliminates this possibility for an undominated
* 
v by requiring a majority to have its preferred directions on the 
* same side as v of any hyperplane containing the origin. 
It can now be shown that the zero direction is an equilibrium 
or is undominated if and only if the same is true of all directions. 
Interpreted loosely, this means that a proposal to not shift the status 
i quo is winning if and only if any other proposed shift is also winning • 
. One could say in this case that society is indifferent as to the 
direction the status quo marginally shifts, just as an individual wCXIld 
be if the status quo were located at an extremum of his utility function. 
Corollary 1: The zero direction is an equilibrium (undominated) if and 
only if all directions are equilibria (undominated). 
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Proof: By theorem 2, 0 £ B is undominated iff P [s'a � O] � 1/2 for
all a £ En, which is true iff all v £ B are undominated. 0 is an
equilibrium provided PL1 (0,v) ?: 0 for all v £ B, which is true iff
P [s'v < O] = P [s'v > O] for all v £ B. But the latter is true iff
PL1 (v1, v2) = 0 for all v1, v2 £ B, or rather, iff every v £ B is
an equilibrium. 
III. EXPLOITING A FIXED OPPONENT
In this section we show that if one candidate rigidly adopts 
a direction vector on a particular side of B, to be called B-, then
the optimal vector for the opponent to choose lies in B+, the side of 
B opposite B-. The two vectors will be located symmetrically about
+ -the hyperplane that separates B from B Thus, entirely half the 
directions will be inferior in the sense that only if both candidates 
are rigid will they both choose inferior directions. Since B+ shall
be defined as the half of B containing the largest fraction of non-
indifferent voters, this result may also be interpreted as follows: 
once an extremist candidate becomes too extreme, the more extreme he 
beco�es the further his opponent should diverge from him. Although 
this divergence result is similar to that which Hinich and Ordeshook 
[1968] proved for Euclidean models, 1t differs fundamentally by not 
requiring abstention of nonindifferent voters. Furthermore, no 
symmetry requirements are imposed or equilibriums assumed to exist. 
Before formally presenting theorem 3, we need some definitions. 
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Definition 3: Let P = sup {P [s'c > O] - P [s'c < O]}. Assuming a 
vector c £ B exists such that P P [s'c> O] P [s'c < O] , let B-
{v £ B: v'c < O}, and B
+ = {v £ B: v'c L O}.
The direction vector c exists if P represents either a continuum of
voters or a finite number of voters. Hence it is not restrictive to 
assume for the remainder of this section that c exists. The interesting
case is when P > O, in which case the following also indicates that any 
equilibrium direction vector is in B+. 
Theorem 3: If v2 £ B
-, then the function f (v) = PL1 (v, v2) is maximized
on B by a vectqr v = v2 - (2c' v2)� contained in B
+.
Proof: Clearly l!vli = 1 and v'c = -v2c > 0. Hence v £ B+. The proof
is finished by  observing that 
P [s ' (V - v 2) > 0] - P [s ' (V - v 2) < 0]
P [(-2c'v2)s'c > O] - P [ (-2c'v2)s'c < O] 
P [s 'c > o] - P [s 'c < o] 
= P. 
Theorem 3 is illustrated in figure 2, which also indicates 
further results obtainable when P exhibits some monotonicity. The 
half circles B+ and B- are separated by line M. The optimal vector 1. 
to choose against a vector in B- like v2 is a vector in B
+ like v1•
�' 
Notice that if v is not perpendicular to M, then v1 is not diverging
* 
toward v but only mvay from M and v 2 as v 2 moves further from Minto
B-. Hence v2 does hc:ve some ability to drmv v1 m·rny from v *, but not
M -- - -
FIGURE 2 
Exploiting a Fixed Opponent When Ideal 
Directions Are Distributed Monotonically 
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out of B+. Furthermore, in this situation, if 0ne candidate adopts
a vector s1 in B+ that is not v
*
, then his opponent increasingly
receives more votes by choosing vectors increasingly closer to s1,
but always between s1 and v
*
. For example, s2 does better than s3
for candidate 1 when candidate 2 adopts s1. Candidate 1 can insure
that the fraction of the electorate voting for him is within any 
arbitrary amount of the fraction of the electorate whose preferred 
vectors lie above the line L. 
IV. DIRECTION VOTING IN AN EUCLIDEAN MODEL
We now assume that individuals have well-defined preferences 
over an Euclidean issue space, but that the outcomes associated with 
the candidates are restricted to a small neighborhood of· the status quo 
(origin). In fact, w.e assume the simplest case considered in Euclidean 
models: each voter i most prefers a point xi and prefers y to z if and
only if II xi - y Ii < Ii xi - z II • In the 11otation of the basic model,
each voter i now most prefers the direction si for which ASi = xi has a
solution A> O. When candidate j chooses a point strategy z. , he is
J 
adopting the direction v. for' which AV. = z. has a solutio� A > 0.J J J 
Voting is again assumed to agree with issue preferences, and only 
indifferent individuals abstain. 
The first question concerns the properties that a distribution 
of voter's preferred points must satisfy for plurality equilibria to 
exist. We first observe that if P is a probability measure representing
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preferred points in the issue space, it induces a probability measure P 
on B to represent preferred directions: P[s £ AJ = P[x £ C(A)J for any
(Borel) subset A of B, where C (A) =
' 1X £ En: ax £ A for some a > 0} is
A 
the cone spanned by A, and P[s = OJ = P[x = OJ . Thus the condition of 
theorem 2 can be considered to apply to P as well as P. But we show 
further that if an equilibrium point exists for a distribution of voters 
when candidates may choose any po�nts irt the issue space, then a 
corresponding undominated direction exists when outcomes associated 
with candidates are essentially shift directions. We first need formal 
definitions. 
Definition 4:  A point z £E
n is undominated provided
P [ II z - x I! � I! y - x II J :::: 1/2 for all y £ En. A point z is an 
equilibrium in.the plurality game provided it satisfies
A 
DefiEition 5: A point z £ E
n is a total �Eian of P provided
A 
P [a'(x - z) � O] � 1/2 for all a£ En.
As previously mentioned, an undominated point is known to be
a total median. It is also true that, analogously to theorem 1, undom-
inated points are equilibria. 
Leillllla 1: In an Euclidean model, z £ E
n is undominated if and only if
it is an equilibrium. 
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Proof: n Let Y £ E and, for 0 � a � 1, define y(a) ay + (1 - a)z.
For z undominated, P[ II z _ x !/:'.:: l a(y) _ x II l 2: Plll z - x 11 > 11 a Cy) - x II J. 
Hence, P[ l z - xii < llY - x II J = lim P[ l z - xli:Sl!a(y) - xii J
a->-1-
;:: lim P[ llz - xii> f!a(y) -x l!J
a->-1-
> 
A I - P[ I z - x I > II y - x II J. 
Therefore z is an equilibrium. The converse is obvious. 
Theorem 4 :  If z £ En i s  an i l  ' b · * �qu i rium point, then any direction v 
* 
satisfy�ng AV = z for some A 2: 0 is undominated. If z r 0 or
A * P[x = OJ = O, then v is also an equilibrium direction. 
�: Let v £ B be any direction except v
*.
Hence 
* Then z.' (v - v) 2: O.
* A * P[s'(v - v) �OJ = P[x'(v - v) �OJ 
> 
A * * 
- P[x'(v - v)? z'(v - v)J � 1/2 
iince z is undominated and hence a total median. 
1ndominated, If z r O, then z' (v* - v) =A (1 _ 
[ I * A * P s (v - v) >OJ= P[x'(v - v) >OJ
A * * � P[x'(v - v) � z'(v - v)J � 1/2.
This proves that v* is
* v'v ) > 0 and
bis implies that v * is an equilibriu1n i' f z J. r 0. Finally, if 
'[x = OJ = O, then theorem 1 implies that v* is an equilibrium.
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The existence of undominated direction requires P to satisfy 
more than the median-liY.3 part of the condition in theorem 2, but 
theorem 4 establishes that no more than a total median condition on P 
is needed. In fact, the converse of theorem 4 is false -- existence of 
direction equilibria does not guarantee the existence of point equilibria 
for a corresponding Euclidean model. As a particularly easy example, 
illustrated in figure 3, suppose th.ere are three voters whose ideal
points pl ' p2 and p3 are arranged in a triangle to one side of the
* 
status quo S. Then no total median exists, but the direction vector v 
that points toward P3 satisfies the condition of theorem 2 and so
represents an equilibrium. 7 
A consequence of theorem 4 and corollary 1 is that the 
status quo is an equilibrium point if and only if all directions are 
undominated. Again, the heuristic interpretation is that the status 
quo is at a social maximum if and only if society is indifferent about 
the direction the status quo moves, 
Theorem 4 also determines a consistency relationship 
between the two types of equilibria: if point equilibria exist, 
equil�brium direction vectors will "point" towards them. Suppose we 
now consider the situation in which a candidate may choose either a 
point or a direction as a strategy. Using another assumption about 
voter behavior, we can establish another consistency property for each 
type of strategy: if one candidate has chosen either a directicn vector 
or a point (not the status quo) as his strategy, then his opponent can 
s 
FIGURE 3 
I 
I 
Situation with a Direction Equilibrium 
But No Point Equilibrium 
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do no better than to choose the same type of strategy. The additional 
assumption concerns the voter's decision rule when one candidate chooses 
'·'e shall suppose the voter believes a direction and the other a point. w 
the candidate who chooses a point can shift the status quo the main-
and that the other candidate would shift the status quo tained distance, 
the same amount. Based upon an "equally likely" type of rationale, this 
assumption implies that voters �ill always vote as if the two candidates 
h hypersphere about the status quo, i. e. ,had chosen points on t e same 
voters will direction vote. 
The internal consistency property now follows easily. 
If candidate 2 has chosen a direction, then regardless of the type of 
1 Chooses, the electorate will behave as if both strategy candidate 
had chosen directions. But if candidate 2 has chosen a point z, then 
that Candidate 1 might choose, he can achieve for any direction v 
the same outcome by choosing the point \lz ! I v.
Of either infinite or finite infor­However, the addition 
direction strategies to dominate point mation costs might cause 
strategies. If the cost of obtaining information about voters' 
f h t t quo is "too" Over more than a neighborhood o t e s a us preferences 
high, or if· only information about preferences over directions can be 
h Candi. dates will have no real basis for choosing obtained, then t e 
point strategies. Possessing only uncertain knowledge about voter 
away from the status quo, the risk-averse candidate may preferences 
prefer a direction strategy to an exact point. If each candidate is 
also uncertain as to the amount of information the other candidate 
possesses about voter preferences away from the status quo, it is 
even more likely that direction strategies will dominate. This 
follows because one candidate's choice of a direction strategy 
essentially forces the opponent to also choose a direction strategy 
21 
and hence to utilize only information about the distribution of pre-
£erred directions, presumably known to both candidates. Formaliza.-
tion of these concepts is left for future work. 
V. SUMMARY 
The direction model of the electoral process allows limits 
to candidate mobility or voter perception and cognition. It is
applicable (1) if only issue outcomes near the status quo are 
associated with candidates; (2) if only directional information is 
transmitted to voters; (3) if voter preferences are only well-defined 
near the status quo or are only defined for directions in which it 
can shift; or (4) if the outcome space is curved so that it can be 
modeled as a hypersphr· :e. 
Assuming that a voter will vote for the candidate who 
campaigns for a direction closest to his own preferred direction, 
plurality equilibria were shown to be undominated. The identity of 
the two types of solutions was established if nobody was totally 
indifferent. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of undominated directions was determined. The first part 
of the condition, stating that any hyperplane containing the undomi-
nated direction vector and the origin bisects the distribution of 
22 
preferred directions, is analogous to the total median condition in 
the simple Euclidean models. The remainder of the condition in 
theorem 2, stating that a majority of the electorate's preferred 
direction vectors lie on the same side as the undominated direction 
vector of any hyperplane containing the origin, is not implied by the 
median-like property .in this model because of the "curved" nature of 
the directiGnal domain space, The second part of the condition is 
what allows a candidate to diverge from a fixed direction chosen by 
an extremist opponent, where at least half the feasible directions 
are defined to be extremist for every distribution of the electorates' 
'preferred directions. 
Although the addition of a second part to the characterizing 
condition 'for equilibrium seems to further decrease the likelihood of 
its occurrence, it was shown that in situations where the assumptions 
of the Bimple Euclidean model are met, point equilibria exist only if 
corresponding undominated directions also exist. But the converse of 
this theorem is false -- some distributions of voter preferences 
yield direction but not point equilibria. In situations where both 
types of equilibria exist, contradictory predictions will not occur 
since equflibrium direction vectors point in the direction of existing 
equilibrium points. 
Finally, it was argued that a candidate has no incentive to 
adopt a type of strategy· different from ·the type he knows his 
opponen� will choose. This result can be interpreted as an internal 
stability property for each model. However, it was suggested that 
23 
when a candidate's uncertainty about voter's preferences away from the 
status quo and about the extent of his opponent's information are con­
sidered, only the direction model may exhibit this internal stability. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1: * Suppose v is an equilibrium. Then for any
,� * * other v £ B, P [s ' (v - v) >OJ� P[s' (v - v) <OJ. Hence v is 
24 
[ I 
>:< 
] I " I � undominated since P s (v - v) :;, 0 :;, P(s (v'" - v) < 0) = l - P[ s (v ·' - v) ;;, o). 
* Conversely, suppose v is undominated but not an equilibrium,
and that P[s"'O] = o. For any a E En define the following sets:
sl (a) [ s E :B: 
I o}s a > 
[s EB:
I 
O} s2(a) s a < 
H(a) [ s E B: I 0}. = s a 
* By assumption, there exists v E B such that PL1 (v , v) < O. Hence,' �' letting t = v - v, there is an E > 0 such that
Since P[fa}] > 0 for only a countable number of a EB, there exists 
b E B such that b 'v* <: 0 and P[H (b) J = 0. Hence P(H(b) n H(t)) = 0,
Let H. = S,(b) n H(t) for i = 1, 2.1 1 
Consider the case P[H1] _:::. P[H2]. For n > 1, define
c = n-l b + (1 - n-1)t . We now show that lim S. (c ) = H. U S.(t), n n-700 1 n 1 1 
or, by definition, that 
00 °' 
n U S.(c )
k=l n=k 1 n 
"' co U n S.(c ) = H. U S.(t).
k= l n=k 1 n 1 1 
-1 I -1 I , 
First, observe that· s1c = n s b + (1 - n )s t monotonically
n I 
approaches s t as n -7 oo, 
oo CO I 
Hence s E n U S1(c ) <=> s c 
· k=l n=k n n 
for infinitely many n <=> s 1 en ::::, 0 for only finitely many
> 0
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n <.=> s E U n S1(c ). Also, s E H1 U S1(t) <=> s't > 0 ork=l n=k n 
(s't = 0 and s'b > 0) <=> s'c > 0 for all n sufficiently largen 
�> s E n U s1(c ) . The argument for i = 2 is similar.k=l n=k n 
So by the continuity of a finite measure, and since Hi and
Si(t) are disjoint, there exists an integer n0 such that
(ii) !P[S.(c)) - P[H.] - P[S.(t)] I < -2
E
1 1 1 
for all c in the arc A =  fc EB: c = O'c + j3t, O! > 0, i3 > O}. For 
� I\ • no � ... 
distinct c·, c E A, there is no real nu1nber y such that c = ye. Hence
s EH(�) n H(c) <=> s 1b = 0 and s 't = 0 <=> s E H(b) n H(t). Thus
H("6) n H(c) = H(b) n H(t) for all distinct � . c EA. So again by a
countability argument, there exists c EA such that 
P[H(C)] = P[H(b) n H(t)] = 0, From (i) and (ii), and since we are
co
.
nsidering the case P[H1] .::; P[H2], we now obtain
* Now if v = O, let v = -c, and otherwise let 
v = v
* 
- (2c'v
*
)c. Clearly, v EB. Furthermore, since
brV
* 
_> Q I * * and v v < 1, when v f 0 we have 
* 
Thus P[s' (v - v) �OJ = P[s'c �OJ, whether or not v
* 
Hence, as P[H (c)J = 0, (iii) implies that 
0.
* 
[ I i.< ] P s (v' - V) ;;,, O P[S 1 (c)] + P[H(c}] 
< P(Sz(C)] 
[ I * - ] 1 - P s (v - v) ;;,, 0 • 
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Therefore v is not undominated, contrary to assumption. The proof 
is similar for the case P[H1] > P[H2].
1. 
2. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The assumptions of electcral spatial models and many of their 
predicticns are reviewed in Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970), 
and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) . 
In this interpretation the status quo must be on the surface of 
the hypersphere rather than at its center. The status quo shall 
be assumed under this interpretation to play no role in the 
model, just as it plays no role in the.usual Euclidean spatial 
models. 
3. Empirical evidence for direction voting might be found in some
spatial model experiments conducted by Fiorina and Plott
(personal communication -- but see Fiorina and Plott [1975] for
details on similar experiments) . In their experiments, each
voter's payoff function declined with distance from a single
point where it achieved its maximum. When' a candidate asked:
"Who wants me to move into this rectangle?", usually all voters
whose optimal points were in the specified rectangle indicated
approval of the move. If the voters had utilized subjective
estimates of the distances the candidate would move into the 
specified rectangle, those voters very near the border containing 
28 
·the candidate's current position probably would not have been in 
.favor of such a move. But as it turned out, most who had a 
utility gradient at the candidate's current point that formed an 
acute angle with the proposed direction vector favored the move. 
This behavior suggests direction voting. 
4. See Matthews [1977) for an extensive treatment of directional
preferences.
5. Undominated directions to simple games with a finite number of
players are di£.cussed extensively in Matthews [1977). 
6.  Total medians are formally defined in definition 5, section IV. 
7. However, it is shown in Matthews [1977) that existence of undomi-
nated directions is equivalent to satisfaction of pairwise
symmetry conditions similar to those Plott (1967) establishes
for his constrained voting equilibria. Their stringency implies
that existence is only slightly mox� "common" for directional
than point equilibria. Cohen and Matthews [1977) elaborate on
this point.
8. When an individual prefers z1 over z2 if and only if 
II xi - zi I I < II xi - z2 II , directfon voting exactly agrees with
preferences if the outcomes candidates can choose are constrained 
29 
to lie on the same hypersphere centered at the status quo 
(origin). This follows trivially for xi 0. Otherwise, if
I 
xizl > xiz2 <=> 
s '. v1 > s '. v2, where s . = x. I I I  x. I I  and v. = z . I II z . II • l. l. l. l. l. J J J 
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